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Abstract

A large literature examines the interaction of private and public funding of charities, much of it
testing if public funding crowds out private funding. In this paper I look for two alternative
phenomena using a large panel data set gathered from nonprofit organizations' tax returns. First,
I look for crowding out in the opposite direction: increased private funding may cause reduced
public funding. Second, I test whether one type of funding acts as a signal of charity quality and
thus crowds in other funding. I find evidence that government grants crowd in private donations.
Crowding in is larger for younger charities. This is consistent with signaling, if donors know
less about younger charities and the signal value is stronger. I find no evidence of an effect of
private donations on government grants.
Keywords: Nonprofit Organizations; Public Goods
JEL Codes: H4, L3
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Public goods are often provided by both governments and individuals. The interaction of
these two sources may affect the overall level of funding. In response to an increase in
government spending on a public good or charity, individuals may reduce their contributions.
The same effect can occur in the opposite direction. If a government sees that private donations
to a charity have risen, then it may reduce its support of that charity. Additionally, some funding
may crowd in other funding if it signals charity quality.
The literature on crowding out extends back to Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984), who
show theoretically that an exogenous increase in government funding to charities decreases
private donations dollar-for-dollar. Some empirical studies, including Kingma (1989), find
support for such crowding out, but typically at a rate less than one-for-one. 1 Some studies find
crowding in; Khanna and Sandler (2000) find this for charities in the UK, and Payne (2001) finds
this for academic research institutions. Crowding in may occur if grants provide a positive signal
of charity quality.2 A signaling model of contributions to charities is presented in Payne (2001),
Vesterlund (2003), and Andreoni (2006), where "seed money" from large donors or
announcements of previous donations increase others' donations by acting as a signal of the
charity's quality. Evidence of this effect is found in a field experiment in List and LuckingReiley (2002).3
That literature focuses solely on how government spending affects individual giving.4
This paper also examines the opposite direction of causality: do private contributions to charities
affect public contributions? I look for evidence of either crowding out or crowding in in both
1

One explanation for partial crowding out, provided by Andreoni (1989), is that individuals are "impure altruists" in
that they receive a "warm glow" from their own giving, independent of the level of the public good. For more
evidence of crowding out in other environments, Parker and Thurman (2011) find that government provision of open
space can crowd out purchases from private land trusts, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) find that Medicaid crowds out
private insurance, Gruber and Hungerman (2007) find that New Deal programs during the Great Depression
crowded out church spending on social services, Simmons and Emanuele (2004) find that government funding can
crowd out individuals' donations of both money and time, and Brooks (2003) finds that government grants affect
both the number of donors and the average donation per donor.
2
Rose-Ackerman (1986) describes other conditions under which government grants can crowd in private donations.
For instance, matching grants are likely to spur an increase in donations. Grants may also come with mandated
regulatory changes that make the charity more appealing to donors. If a charity exhibits economies of scale, then
increased government revenue reduces the marginal cost of providing the service, making private donations more
effective.
3
Landry et. al. (2006) also find some evidence that seed money increases others' contributions, but they find a
stronger effect from being entered in a lottery for a cash prize when donating and from the physical attractiveness of
the person asking for a contribution. Lange (2006) develops a model where the lottery prize money is provided by
donors and thus acts similarly to seed money.
4
See also Steinberg (1987) for a model of how federal government spending affects private giving and local
government spending, and Steinberg (1991) for an empirical meta-analysis.
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directions using panel data from almost 30,000 charities over six years. Though numerous
papers test whether government grants crowd out private donations to charities, none can be
found that test for crowding out in the opposite direction using micro-level data.5 I also examine
whether crowding in is consistent with quality signaling.
I find that government grants crowd in private donations, with a dollar increase in
government grants leading to an increase in private donations between 10 and 30 cents. I find
this result in various specifications of the data sample, although the statistical significance of the
coefficient is generally just below the 10 percent level. It is statistically significant at the 5
percent level in regressions using a subset of charities as the sample. I also find that this
crowding in is consistent with signaling, since the rate of crowding in is larger for younger
charities. These are charities about which less information is likely to be known by donors, and
thus the signal value of a grant ought to be larger. For the oldest charities, the crowding-in effect
disappears. Estimates of the effect of private donations on government grants are not significant.
The presence of crowding in of contributions to charities is of concern to both
governments and individuals who make these contributions. A government might choose an
optimal level of provision of a charity or public good and adjust its funding to reach that level.
Without accounting for the crowding in response by private donors, funding may exceed the
optimal level. Likewise, if the level of private donations affects government support, then an
individual's optimal level of giving ought to account for the reaction of government grants.
Many worry that large increases in private funding for global public health initiatives, including
large grants from the Gates Foundation, are causing local governments to reduce health
spending, evidence of crowding out of government grants.6 For a small individual donor, the
magnitude of crowd out is negligible, but for a donor or foundation making a large gift this
consideration may be important.
A theoretical model is not presented here but is available in an earlier working paper
version of this paper (Heutel 2009) or an online appendix. Here I summarize the main intuitive
findings of the model that guide the empirical work. The one-for-one crowding out result from
Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984) assumes that government grants are set exogenously and private

5

Garrett and Rhine (2010) use time series data on aggregate government and private contributions to charities to test
for Granger causality in both directions. They find evidence that grants crowd out donations and that donations
crowd out grants for some types of charities and some types of government funding.
6
See Cohen (2006) and Smith and MacKellar (2007).
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donors respond to them. An alternative assumption is that private donations are exogenous, and
the government chooses a level of contributions to maximize social welfare in response. Under
this assumption a symmetric result is found: private donations crowd out government grants at a
one-for-one rate. The model can be extended a number of ways, by including a warm glow
effect, modeling governments as non-benevolent, including charity response, or considering
various equilibria in which both private donors and governments move endogenously. The warm
glow effect in particular changes the magnitude of crowding out; it will be at a rate less than onefor-one. But the main finding is sustained: government grants can respond to private donors in
the same way that private donors can respond to government grants. The first empirical question
is the following: do private donations crowd out government grants?
The second empirical question is generated by extending the model to allow for
information asymmetry. If the government observes a charity's quality while private donors do
not, the government can use its funding to signal quality. If the government signals higher
quality with higher funding, then a crowding-in effect will emerge: higher government grants
will cause higher private donations. Symmetrically, if private donors have the better information
about charity quality, their donations can act as signals to the government and crowd in grants.
The magnitude of this crowding in depends on how individuals' beliefs about charity quality are
influenced by government grants, i.e., the strength of the signal. The crowding-in effect exists
alongside the crowding-out effect; it is not clear which effect dominates. The second empirical
question is thus the following: is there any evidence of crowding in, either of private donations
by government grants or in the opposite direction?
The finding of crowding in is not definitive evidence of signaling, since crowding in
could materialize for other reasons. So, where I do find crowding in, I also investigate if the
crowding in is consistent with signaling. The crowding-in effect occurs only when there is
imperfect information about charity quality. It is likely that information about charity quality
varies by charity. Older charities are more likely to have well-established reputations; younger
charities are more likely to be unknown by donors. I therefore expect that the crowding-in effect
from signaling will be larger for younger charities than for older charities. Another empirical
question is the following: where there is crowding in, does its magnitude vary by charity age?
Charities typically advertise the grants they receive from both governments and private
grant makers on their websites, in newsletters, and in press releases. If government grants

6
crowded out private giving, it is unlikely that charities would make public the receipt of such
grants. On the other hand, grants signaling quality and crowding in donations are more
consistent with this observed behavior.

1. DATA
The data on nonprofit organizations come from IRS tax returns filed by eligible
organizations. These data are collected and distributed by the National Center for Charitable
Statistics (NCCS) at the Urban Institute.7 They are based on the Forms 990 or 990EZ that must
be filed by all 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations except for religious organizations and any
organization with less than $25,000 in gross receipts.8 These data from 1998-2003 are contained
in the Guidestar-NCCS National Nonprofit Research Database, which contains 1,388,480
observations from all public charities that filed within those fiscal years. The data set does not
include 501(c)(3) private foundations, which receive most of their money from investments and
endowments and use it primarily to make grants to organizations rather than directly for
charitable services; private foundations file IRS Form 990-PF.
Organizations are classified according to the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities
(NTEE), a system developed by the NCCS. The NTEE divides charities into 645 centile level
codes, collapsible into 26 major groups and 10 major categories. In order to make my results
more comparable with prior research, I limit my scope to a particular set of charities. Most
research in crowding out or crowding in of charitable donations has examined social service
charities, and so I select organizations from the following NTEE categories: crime, employment,
food and nutrition, housing, human services and community improvement.9
The large data set, containing entries from all 501(c)(3) nonprofit charities that filed with
the IRS between 1998 and 2003, is useful for analysis but also presents problems with messy
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http://nccs.urban.org.
Religious organizations receive 35 percent of all charitable giving in the United States (Giving USA, 2011).
Religious organizations that receive the majority of their revenue from serving the general public are required to file
Forms 990. These include the Sisters of Mercy hospital chain and Lutheran Social Services. About 15,000 such
religious organizations were required to file in 2001. Examining donations to Presbyterian Church congregations,
Hungerman (2005) finds that government provision of charitable services crowd out church donations by 20-38
cents on the dollar.
9
These are the organizations listed under the 1-digit NTEE codes of I, J, K, L, P and S. This is the same set of
codes used by Andreoni and Payne (2003) for their set of social service organizations. Andreoni and Payne (2003)
also exclude some organizations that they describe as not directly providing services, while I include all 501(c)(3)
organizations in those categories (see their fn 15).
8

7
data. Still, I undertake measures to clean the data. The data set contains 339,716 observations
on 76,725 charities. I drop observations for which there is clear evidence of reporting error.
Some charities report revenues by category (e.g. private donations, government grants) that do
not add up to the reported level of total revenues. Likewise, for some charities the expenditures
do not add up correctly. I purge all of these observations from the data set, leaving 321,094
observations (95 percent) and 75,226 charities (98 percent). Though the data are a panel, it is a
very unbalanced one. To compensate, I include in the base case regressions only those charities
that appear for all six years, leaving 175,242 observations (55 percent of the previous total) and
29,207 charities (39 percent). Below, I consider how limiting the data set to a balanced panel
affects both the summary statistics and the regression results. Finally, I eliminate charities that
ever report a negative value for private donations, government grants, or program service
revenue, eliminating an additional 69 charities (only 0.2 percent). Regressions are performed on
this cleaned data sample as well as on a number of subsamples that eliminate certain types of
charities or observations, as described below. In general, the results that I obtain in the base case
are comparable across these different sample specifications. This is especially important to note
for this application, since previous authors have found that when working with data from Form
990s the choice of sample matters greatly for the results.
Previous authors have found discrepancies or errors in similar data sets, especially in the
identifier variables for the charity's type (NTEE code) and state. Among the charities in the
balanced panel, none change their NTEE code over the six year period. Some charities (1,206,
or 4.1 percent) do change states. This could be due to data error, which is problematic since
many of my control variables and instruments are at the state-year level. Or, it could result in the
charity actually relocating, in which case I want to take advantage of that variation. I identify the
charities that are erroneously coded as changing states in the following way. Of the charities that
are reported to change states, 830 of them (68.8 percent) have the same state listed for five out of
the six years, and the year in which the state is listed differently is not the first or last year of the
sample. As it is unlikely that a charity would relocate one year and then relocate back the
following year, I interpret these observations as errors and replace the state variable with the
state from the charity's other five observations. The remaining 376 charities either moved in the
first or last years of the sample period or had more than one year in a different location, and I do
not change the state variables for them. An inspection of the scans of the original 990 forms for
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several of these charities supports this distinction between those that actually moved and those
that were inaccurately reported.10
Table 1 presents revenues aggregated into four main categories and compares summary
statistics from the full, uncleaned data set to those from the smaller sample used in the analysis.
Private donations include direct and indirect public support.11 Government grants and program
service revenue have their own categories,12 and the remaining revenues are classified as "other."
I also present statistics on charities' reported fundraising expenditures. Table 1 shows that the
mean values are all much higher than the median values, and even the 75th percentile values,
suggesting a data set that is skewed towards high-revenue organizations. The differences
between corresponding statistics in the full data set and the cleaned sample are small; the mean
values of all variables are smaller and the median and 75th percentiles are larger in the limited
data compared to the full set. The limited data are slightly less skewed than the full data, and
hence performing econometric analyses on this limited sample may overemphasize the effect
from larger charities.

2. ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY
Fundamentally, two different empirical questions are investigated. First, do government
grants affect private donations to charities? Second, do private donations affect government
grants? While numerous papers have tested for causality in the first direction, no paper has
examined causality in the opposite direction using panel data on a large number of charities.
Because of these two questions, I run two separate regressions, one in which the level of private
donations to a charity is the dependent variable and the level of government grants is an
independent variable, and one with those two variables reversed. Initially I merely identify
whether crowding out or crowding in occurs in either direction, and I do not attempt to account
for its source. Following these initial regressions, I will test whether any crowding in that I find
is explained by signaling. I show that crowding in is stronger among those charities for which
less information is known by donors, i.e. younger charities.
10

Simply dropping all charities that report moving states from the regression analysis results in coefficients of
approximately the same value as in the base case.
11
Indirect public support is comprised mainly of donations given to the charities collected by federated fundraising
agencies, such as the United Way.
12
Program service revenue is the money collected from the services that form the organizations' exemption from
tax. For example, a hospital would count as program service revenue all of its charges from medical services.

9
The estimating equations take the following form:
yit = βxit + BXit + αi + γt + eit
The dependent variable yit is either the level of government grants or the level of private
donations for charity i in year t, depending on which regression is run. The right-hand-side
variable of interest, xit, is the opposite value (i.e. xit is government grants when yit is private
donations, and vice versa). The net crowding-out or crowding-in effect is β. A vector of
controls Xit is included for each observation. I exploit the panel nature of the data by including
an organization-fixed effect and a year-fixed effect, αi and γt, respectively.13 The error is eit.
The estimate of β will clearly be biased since both private donations and government
grants are determined endogenously. A common shock, for instance an increase in demand for a
charity's services, may affect both donations and grants simultaneously in the same direction,
biasing upwards β. Alternatively, endogeneity could bias the estimate downwards. A
restructuring of the charity could cause it to reallocate its funding between donations and grants,
which would create a negative correlation between these two values not due to crowding out.
To overcome this bias and identify β, I utilize instrumental variables. (Regressions in both
directions without using instrumental variables are presented in the online appendix.)
Two separate sets of instrumental variables are required: one for each direction of
causality. First, in the regression where private donations are the dependent variable and
government grants are the endogenous regressor, appropriate instruments must be relevant
(affecting the level of government grants) and excludable (not directly affecting the level of
private donations). Furthermore, because I am effectively estimating simultaneous equations, the
instrument for government grants should also not belong as an instrument in the first stage of the
private donations equation. For this set of instruments, I use state-year-level measures of
government transfers to individuals from Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs.14 This
represents the overall level of transfers and government giving in a state a particular year. Some
states may be more "generous" in their giving, and these instruments ought to proxy that.15 The
13

The Hausman specification test rejects the assumption that the unobservable effect is uncorrelated with the other
regressors, so a fixed-effects model is employed rather than a random-effects model.
14
Khanna and Sandler (2000), Andreoni and Payne (2003), and Payne (1998) use similar instruments. Data are
available from the U.S. Social Security Administration website.
15
Though the basic level of SSI benefits is set at the federal level, many states choose to supplement that value. For
instance, California's state supplement can raise the $674 federal benefit rate for a single person to $1086, depending
on circumstances (http://ssa.gov/pubs/11125.html), whereas six states pay no supplement
(http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-benefits-ussi.htm). In addition to the benefit rate, eligibility criteria for the disability
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generosity of government is determined in a political process, and thus it may be directly
correlated with private donations and fail the exogeneity requirement: more generous donors
elect more generous governments. This is controlled for by the inclusion in the set of controls
Xit of the political and economic variables described below. The maintained assumption is that
whatever variance in a state's SSI transfers not accounted for by political or economic variables
ought to capture something about the government itself rather than about the underlying
electorate, and thus these instruments ought to satisfy the exogeneity assumption.
Second, instrumental variables for private donations ought to affect private donations but
not government grants directly. I use one instrument for private donations, available at the
charity-year level: membership dues. Funding from individuals can come from two sources,
listed separately on the Form 990: direct public support (donations) and dues. Though it may
appear that membership dues are just an alternative way to classify private contributions, there
are well-defined differences between the two funding sources, as delineated in the Form 990
instructions. Charities are instructed to report as dues only those payments that "compare
reasonably" with available membership benefits. Examples of benefits listed in the instructions
include subscriptions to publications or newsletters and reduced-rate admissions to events. If
membership dues exceed the value of such benefits, then charities are instructed to report the
difference in value as donations, not dues.16 Dues are thus what members pay for the private
goods consisting of membership benefits, not the public good that is the charity's primary
purpose. The amount of dues that a charity receives is likely to be correlated with the amount of
private donations received, since charities with higher membership bases may get more of both
types of revenues. However, given that charities provide public goods only using monies from

payments may vary by state, since each state independently determines disability status
(http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/general-info.htm). I also used the level of OASDI benefits as
instruments, but adding those had no effect on the results.
16
The wording from the 2003 Form 990 Instructions (nearly identical for all sample years) is: "Dues received by an
organization, to the extent they are more than the monetary value of the membership benefits available to the dues
payer, are a contribution that should be reported on line 1a [private donations]." Also: "If a member pays dues
mainly to support the organization's activities and not to obtain benefits of more than nominal monetary value, those
dues are a contribution to the organization includable on line 1a." After the 2007 tax year, the Form 990 was
substantially redesigned, and membership dues are no longer reported as a separate category. (Dues are now
included with program service revenue, not with private donations.)
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their contributions and not using monies from dues, the level of government grants ought not to
respond to the level of dues.17
There are several caveats to this instrument choice. First, there may be reporting error.
Though charities are clearly instructed to delineate appropriately between dues and contributions,
they may neglect to do so. Second, the instrument may be irrelevant; dues may not correlate
with donations. Third, the exogeneity assumption may fail, if governments do in fact respond to
the level of dues, treating them as contributions to a public good.
Though the exogeneity assumption cannot directly be tested, the regression results can
shed some light on the validity of the identification strategy. On the whole, identification of the
effect of government grants on private donations is more successful than identification of the
effect in the other direction. First-stage results from both regressions are available in the online
appendix. The F-statistics for the significance of the instruments in the first stage are all greater
than ten for the regressions where government grants are the endogenous regressors and SSI
transfer payments are the instruments, but the F-statistics are less than ten for most of the firststage regressions where private donations are the endogenous regressors and dues are the
instrument. This suggests that dues may be a weak instrument for private donations, and that
those regression results ought to be interpreted with caution. In fact, in the second-stage
regression estimating the effect of private donations on government grants, the coefficient is not
consistently found to be significantly different from zero.
An additional consideration involves the response of the charity itself to grants and
donations. In particular, a growing literature examines how a charity's fundraising expenditures
change in response to government grants (Andreoni and Payne 2003, 2011). Fundraising is
therefore included in both sets of regressions. Furthermore, since fundraising expenditures are
endogenously determined by the charity, I add instrumental variables for fundraising. I use two
different variables at the charity-level as instruments for fundraising expenditures. First, I use
the amount of administrative expenditures reported by a charity on the Form 990.18 Since the
17

An alternative instrument for private donations that I investigated is a measure of the price of a dollar of charitable
donation based on the state's income tax and rules for allowing deductions of those contributions. This, however, is
a poor instrument because the donations to a charity in a particular state do not necessarily come from donors within
that state, because tax rates are heterogeneous within a state, and because tax rates are likely to be directly correlated
with government budgets and hence grants to charities.
18
According to the instructions for the Form 990, administrative expenses, or "management and general" expenses,
are a charity's "expenses for overall organization and management, rather than for its direct conduct of fundraising
activities or program services."
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same personnel can be employed to do both administrative and fundraising tasks, the two types
of expenditures may be correlated. In years when an organization has a higher level of
management expenses, it is likely to be able to spend more effort and money on fundraising; the
first stage regression results support this claim. Furthermore, the level of private donations that a
charity receives in a given year ought not to be directly affected by management expenses, since
management expenses are reported separately from fundraising expenses.19 The administrative
expenditures instrument may also correct for measurement error, if misclassification of
fundraising as administrative expenses is organization-specific. Second, I use the total liabilities
of the charity reported in the current year. This instrument measures the financial security of the
organization, which will help determine its fundraising strategy independent of private or public
funding. A charity facing a less secure financial status (as measured by higher total liabilities)
may seek to increase its fundraising expenditures to compensate; this claim is verified in first
stage regression results. A charity's financial security could directly affect its level of private
donations if donors respond to this level of financial security (e.g. a donor does not want to give
money to a charity that is on the verge of collapse). However, it is unlikely that donors have
information on the contemporaneous financial conditions of a charity, at least not to the extent
that a charity has. Donors may perceive an overall level of a charity's well-being, but this is
controlled for with a charity fixed effect. 20 Fundraising is treated as an endogenous regressor in
all regressions where private donations are the left-hand-side variable; results are comparable
when fundraising is instead treated as exogenous. In the regressions where government grants
are the left-hand-side variable, fundraising is initially treated as exogenous but treated as
endogenous in later robustness checks. In those regressions, the choice of whether to treat
fundraising as exogenous or endogenous does substantively affect the results. A final concern is
the potential for measurement error, especially in how nonprofits report their fundraising vs.
management expenses on their Form 990s. Thornton and Belski (2010) cite concerns with the
990 data and show that donors are influenced by proxies for financial reporting quality.

19

Breman (2008) uses the same variable to instrument for fundraising expenses in a data set from Swedish charities.
However, Thornton and Belski (2010) estimate a significant effect on private donations of a constructed price of
donations, where the constructed price is based in part on management expenses.
20
This same argument is made in Andreoni and Payne (2011), who use this variable as an instrument for fundraising
along with another variable that is unavailable in my dataset: occupancy expenses. Yetman and Yetman (2003) test
for the effect of endowment size (highly correlated with total liabilities) on donations and find no effect.

13
Finally, control variables Xit are added to all of the regressions. At the charity level,
these are the level of program service revenues and all other revenues, as well as the charity's
age, as measured by the date that the IRS bestowed it nonprofit status. Furthermore, I gather a
number of state-year or county-year level variables to control for economic, demographic, and
political conditions. These are matched to the charity by the state or county where the charity is
located. From the Bureau of Labor Statistics I obtain the county-year level unemployment rate,
and from the Bureau of Economic Analysis the county-year level per capita income and total
population. At the state-year level I include the fraction of the population 65 or older, the
fraction of a state's US Congress and Senate delegations that are Democrats, and a dummy for
whether the state governor is a Democrat. Political and economic variables may have important
effects on the levels of both private and public contributions to charities. A state with a higher
proportion of Democrats in power is likely to be composed of more liberal citizens who may be
more willing to provide financial support for charities. Likewise, Democratic congresses may be
more willing to approve higher levels of funding for these groups. If so, leaving out political
proxies causes an upward bias on the coefficient of interest.

3. RESULTS
The results for these instrumental variables, fixed effects regressions are presented in
Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents the results from regressions where private donations are the
dependent variable and government grants are the endogenous regressor; Table 3 presents the
results from regressions where these are reversed. In column 1 are the base case results, using
the full sample of cleaned data. The tables report the F-statistic for the significance of the
instruments in the first-stage of the regression, the Hansen overidentification test J-statistic, and
the Cragg-Donald F-statistic for weak instruments. The reported standard errors allow for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using a Newey-West kernel-based estimator of the
variance matrix.
The coefficient of interest in the regressions in Table 2 is that of government grants. The
expected sign of this coefficient is ambiguous. Absent government signaling of charity quality,
it should be negative, indicating crowding out. Signaling can cause crowding in, making the
coefficient positive. In the first column, the coefficient is positive though not quite statistically
significant (the p-value is 0.190). This is evidence for crowding in rather than crowding out,

14
consistent with results found by Khanna and Sandler (2000) and Payne (2001). Neither program
service revenue nor other revenues are significantly correlated with donations. Fundraising
expenditures increase private donations. The coefficients on the state- and county-year level
controls are generally insignificant.
Columns 2 through 6 present robustness checks using different specifications or by
contracting or expanding the data sample. Column 2 reports results using a Tobit specification to
account for the left-censoring at zero of the dependent variable. This Tobit specification,
however, does not include an organization fixed effect. The point estimate of the coefficient on
government grants is about halved compared to the regression in column 1, but it is significant
since its standard error is much smaller.21
Columns 3 through 5 explore the robustness of these results to contracting or expanding
the dataset. It is possible that crowding out or crowding in is only applicable to a subset of the
charities, for two reasons. First, while some of the controls and instruments are at the state-year
level, not all of the charities operate only in the state where they are registered. Many are
national organizations that accept donations and possibly government grants from other states.
For these charities, these instruments and controls are unlikely to be good predictors. Though I
cannot know for certain which organizations are national and which are local, column 3 excludes
those whose names begin with "National," "American," or "North American." Column 3 also
excludes organizations classified as support organizations under the NTEE taxonomy.22 These
organizations do not directly provide services but support organizations or individuals who do
provide services through management and technical assistance, fundraising, and public policy
analysis. Second, many of the charities receive no government grants throughout the entire sixyear sample period, and many receive no private donations throughout the period. Such charities
are likely to receive no funding at all from one of these two sources, even in response to a change
in the other funding source, and thus I also exclude them from the regressions in column 3.
Limiting the sample in this way increases the magnitude of the coefficient, and it becomes
significant at the 5 percent level.
Column 4 presents regression results when the data set is limited using a different
criterion. Outliers are always problematic, and perhaps they are especially problematic for these
21

Compared to an IV regression without fixed effects and without accounting for censorship, this coefficient is
about three times smaller (coefficients are significant in both regressions).
22
These are organizations whose last two digits of the NTEE centile code are less than 20.
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data. I have already eliminated charities and observations for which there is clear evidence of
accounting or reporting error, for example those whose summed categorical revenues do not add
up to the reported total revenues. Even absent these obvious irregularities, though, one may
worry about charities reporting unusually high levels of donations or grants. In column 4, I
eliminate the influence of the largest charities by dropping from the sample those observations
whose private donations are in the top 5 percent of the total distribution and those observations
whose government grants are in the top 5 percent. This refinement does not substantially change
the regression results compared to column 1. Finally, under data cleaning a large fraction of
organizations was removed for not being in the panel for all six years. Column 5 thus replicates
the regression results without removing charities based on the number of years in which they
appear in the dataset. The coefficient of interest, on government grants, is somewhat larger than
in column 1 but is not significant, since the standard error is larger (despite the larger sample
size).
Overall, Table 2 suggests that a dollar increase in government grants to a charity
increases the charity's private donations by about 10 to 30 cents.23 Though generally not quite
significant at the 10 percent level, the results are comparable across different specifications of
the data sample. I do not claim that one specification is preferred over any other, but rather I
want to investigate whether crowding in varies for different specifications of the sample. Prior
studies of crowding out or crowding in typically present results for only a small subset of the raw
data available. For instance, in Andreoni and Payne (2003), of the original sample of social
service charities, fully 92 percent are dropped from the analysis for one reason or another. In my
results, the most significant coefficients arise from the regressions where the sample is limited
(columns 3 and 4), suggesting that the sample selection employed by Andreoni and Payne (2003)
and other papers may be affecting the significance of their results, if not the magnitudes.
Table 2 presents the F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the firststage regression; they are strongly significant in all columns except the second. Table 2 also
presents the Hansen J test statistic from a test of overidentifying restrictions, possible because the
number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous regressors. The null hypothesis of
this test is that the instruments are valid, so a rejection calls into question the validity of the
instruments. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in any columns. Finally, Table 2 presents
23

In each column I can reject the hypotheses that the coefficient is 1, which would indicate 100 percent crowding in.
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the value of the Cragg-Donald F-statistic from Stock and Yogo (2005), a test for weak
instruments. It should be noted that, though the F-statistics on the instruments from the first
stage regression are high, the Cragg-Donald F-statistics are quite low compared to their critical
values.
Table 3 presents the regressions in the opposite direction, where the level of government
grants is the dependent variable and the level of private donations is the endogenous regressor.
Columns 1 through 5 mimic the respective columns in Table 2. Column 1 is the base case,
column 2 uses IV Tobit, columns 3 and 4 limit the sample as described above, and column 5
includes the unbalanced panel. In addition, Table 3 includes a sixth column, in which
fundraising expenditures are treated as endogenous and instrumented for with the same measures
used in Table 2. The coefficient of interest is on private donations and is negative in four out of
the six columns, but only significantly so in one column. The magnitudes of the point estimates
are large, suggesting that private donations crowd out government grants by 30 percent to 170
percent. But this evidence is weak, because of both the lack of a significant coefficient and the
weak instrument issues described earlier. Furthermore, the regression results from column 4,
which eliminate the top 5 percent of charities measured by government grants or private
donations, give a positive coefficient that is significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient in
column 6, in which fundraising is treated as endogenous, is significantly positive and large. The
results in this direction are thus both mixed and weak. Other regressors are more significant.
Program service revenue is negatively correlated with government grants, as is the county
unemployment rate. The large Cragg-Donald statistics indicate that, though the instruments are
somewhat weak, the 2SLS results are not misleading.24
In addition to being comparable across these alternative sample specifications, the results
for the regressions where private donations are the dependent variable are comparable when
estimated by LIML rather than 2SLS, though these regression results are not reported. These
results are also unaffected by estimating the equations simultaneously using 3SLS. 25

3.1 Crowding in by Charity Age
Because of the high standard errors, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on grants is –1, indicating
100 percent crowding out, in columns 1, 3, 4, and 5.
25
Monte Carlo studies comparing system estimators to equation-by-equation estimators have found that the
efficiency advantages of the former are modest in finite samples (see Greene 2003, p. 451). Replication of the
regressions in Table 3 using either LIML or 3SLS yields mixed results, as do the results presented in Table 3.
24
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The analysis finds evidence that government grants crowd in private donations for these
charities. But is this due to signaling? The signaling explanation depends upon uncertainty
among donors as to the charity quality. Thus a measure of uncertainty about charity quality will
be beneficial in testing the signaling theory: charities about which individuals know less should
experience larger crowding in effects than charities that are well known. How can the
uncertainty about a charity be measured?
I use the age of the charity. Older charities are likely to be better known by donors. If
so, the signaling effect for older charities should be smaller than for younger charities. By
interacting a charity's age with the value of government grants, I can determine if the crowding
in from government grants depends on age.26 The results for this exercise are presented in Table
4, which reports results from regressions where private donations are the dependent variable,
government grants and fundraising expenditures are endogenous regressors, and the same
instruments and controls are used as in Table 2 (though not reported). Column 1 includes the
cleaned data sample used in column 1 of Table 2, and it also includes an interaction term
between age and grants. Column 2 present IV Tobit regression results with the age-grant
interaction, and column 3 limits the sample in the same way as does column 3 in Tables 2 and
3.27 Columns 4 through 6 consider different specifications of the age-grant interaction. Column
4 includes a quadratic term in age, column 5 includes indicators for the four quartiles of the age
distribution and their interactions with grants (the first quartile is the omitted dummy), and
column 6 includes the natural log of age and its interaction rather than the level.
In all columns of Table 4 save the last, the coefficient on grants is significantly positive
and the coefficient on the interaction term is significantly negative. The coefficient on
government grants does not represent the marginal effect of grants since it does not include the
interaction. At the bottom of Table 4, I report the marginal effect of grants evaluated at the
median charity age, as well as the marginal effect of age evaluated both at the 10th percentile and
90th percentile of grants. For the Tobit specification, these are the marginal effects of the
unobserved, censored variable. The marginal effect of age is positive but not significant in most
columns. It is significant in column 4, which includes the quadratic in age. This suggests
26

An alternative measure of charity uncertainty might be generated using publicly available ratings of charities from
organizations such as Charity Navigator. However, these ratings only cover a very small fraction of charities and
have not been around long enough to cover all years in the data set.
27
Unreported regressions also limit and expand the sample in the same way as did columns 4 through 6 of Tables 2
and 3; results are comparable.
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diminishing marginal returns to age. The marginal effect of grants at the tenth percentile of age
is significantly positive in all columns but the last, and it varies between about 0.22 to 1.90,
higher than the marginal effects in Table 2 when the interaction term is not included. At the 90th
percentile of age, the marginal effect of grants is either negative or indistinguishable from zero.
The negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the crowding in effect decreases by
about 1 to 2 cents on the dollar per year the charity has been around. In the first three columns,
the ratio of the coefficient on government grants and the coefficient on the interaction term
indicates that grants crowd in private donations for charities younger than 40 years old and
crowd out donations for charities older than 40. In column 4, which includes the quadratic, the
year at which grants start crowding out is about 25 years. Column 5 shows that, relative to the
youngest age quartile (up to age nine years), the crowding in from grants is lower in all other
quartiles. The marginal effect of grants on donations is not significantly different from zero for
age quartiles three and four, and is only significantly positive at the 10 percent level for age
quartile two. These results support the theory that older charities receive less of a signal from
receipt of grants, and so the value of crowding in is less.28 The exception is column 6, where age
enters in a log form. Here, no significant effects from age or grants arise.29

3.2 Lagged Grants
The econometrics are static. Since charities exist for many years, the effects from
crowding out or from signaling are likely to last for more than just a single year. It thus seems
appropriate to consider dynamic extensions of the empirical results. One would expect that the
signaling effect is likely to be cumulative over time: a grant signaling high quality in period t
will positively influence donations not just in period t but also in periods t+1, t+2, etc. This is
because the quality of a public good is persistent over time. Likewise the stock of grants
received up to a point of time is a measure of the degree of quality certification. A grant in a
28

Crowding in should also be expected if government funding comes in the form of matching grants.
Unfortunately, no information about matching is available in the data. Some of the crowding in phenomenon may
be explained by matching grants, though matching grants do not explain why crowding in is less for older charities
(unless they receive a lower fraction of their government grants in the form of matching grants). Matching, in the
context of intergovernmental grants, is studied in Baicker and Staigler (2005) and Klor (2006).
29
Compare these findings to those in Payne (2001), which also tests for a signaling value of government grants, but
to universities. That paper finds that government grants crowd in private donations for research universities, but
they crowd out private donations for non-research universities. If research universities have greater pre-existing
reputations than non-research universities, then those results are not consistent with the strength of the signal being
inversely related to donors' knowledge of the organization.
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particular year is a noisy signal, but the cumulative sum of grants has less noise and indicates
sustained quality of an organization. Consider instead not the signaling effect but the classic
crowding-out effect. Whether or not this effect is cumulative or merely contemporaneous
depends upon whether the public good is durable or transient in impact. If transient, then the
crowding out from government grants in period t will negatively affect private donations only in
period t. If the public good is durable, then the government grants in period t will crowd out
donations in future periods as well. In addition, without intertemporal separability of utility there
are potentially more dynamic effects. Thus, the effects of government grants on private
donations may be long lasting.
This is tested empirically in Table 5 by regressing private donations (in year t) on either
current government grants (from year t), lagged grants, or cumulative government grants (the
sum of grants to a charity in all years up to t – 1). Each regression in Table 5 includes all of the
same controls and instruments as in Table 2, though they are not reported. Column 1 reports
results from a regression that includes the one-year lag of government grants as the endogenous
regressor (where the instruments are also lagged by one year); the coefficient is not significant.
In column 2, both current and one-year lagged grants are included. The current level of grants
has a positive coefficient, and the one-year lag has a negative coefficient. This may represent a
mean reversion among charities' timing in responses to grants. Another complication is that
grants may be multi-year but reported entirely in the year that the grant was approved. Column 3
includes a one- and two-year lag of grants. Both are negative and insignificant, and the
coefficient on current grants is positive and only significant at the 13 percent level. Lastly,
column 4 includes current and cumulative government grants. The coefficient on current grants
is positive and significant, while the coefficient on cumulative grants is negative with a very
small magnitude and low level of significance. On the whole, these results suggest that the
crowding in effect is largely contemporaneous, with the possible exception of a one-year lag
effect.
An alternative way to look dynamically at the data, to see if current values of donations,
say, are affected by lagged values of government grants, is through a vector autoregression
(VAR). However, testing for Granger causality in either direction using panel data VAR
methods developed in Holtz-Eakin et. al. (1988) fails to find causality from lagged values of
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government grants or private donations. 30 The data used are annual, limiting how much the
effect of timing can be observed. If a grant early in one year affects donations later in the same
fiscal year, then that dynamic response cannot be measured with annual data.

4. CONCLUSION
The prediction of crowding out of private donations by government grants, proposed in
Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984), has had numerous empirical investigations. Many studies,
including Kingma (1989) and Payne (1998), find evidence of partial crowding out. Other papers,
including Khanna and Sandler (2000) and Payne (2001), find evidence of crowding in. Though
their results differ, most of these papers have in common that they use a relatively small sample
of charities, and they test for crowding out or crowding in only in one direction.
Here I extend that literature by looking at a large data set of social service charities that
file Form 990 with the IRS, which includes non-religious charities with at least $25,000 in gross
receipts. The first main contribution is the empirical examination of crowding out in the
opposite direction: private donations crowding out government grants. The second main
contribution is to test if contributions can act as signals for charity quality, leading to crowding
in. I find evidence that government grants crowd in private donations, and this crowding in
appears to be due to signaling, since crowding in is larger for younger charities about which
donors know less. The evidence for crowding out or crowding in in the opposite direction is
weak.
One empirical extension to this paper is to test for signaling from private donations by
taking advantage of a distinction between two types of private donations: those from individuals
and those from private foundations. Foundations (or trusts, corporations, or estates) are likely to
devote resources to researching charities and thus may have more information about charity
quality. Their grants may thus act as a quality signal. In fact, charities typically advertise receipt
of grants from both governments and private organizations, indicating that they expect these
announcements to crowd in donations. Unfortunately, the data from the IRS Form 990s do not
allow this level of disaggregating. Contributions from individuals, as well as trusts,
corporations, estates, and foundations, are all listed under the same category of "direct public

30

Garrett and Rhine (2010) perform VARs on time series data of aggregate annual private donations and
government grants to charities.
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support." If another data source disaggregated private donations into contributions from
individuals and contributions from private foundations, then this extension may give empirical
support to private donations acting as signals.
The signaling explanation assumes that governments have better information about
charity quality than private donors have. It is unfortunately difficult if not impossible to directly
assess this claim. One piece of evidence is the average size of gifts; larger donors are likely to
spend more effort gathering information on charity quality than are small individual donors.
Data on average gift size are unavailable, but of private donations, 73 percent are from
individuals, while only 14 percent are from foundations.31 Individuals are likely to be less
informed than are foundations or governments. Applications for government grants to nonprofits
are lengthy, just like government research grant applications.32 The information that grantmaking agencies receive in these applications likely makes them more informed about a charity's
quality than the average individual donor. It is possible that for political reasons government
spending on a charity may be unrelated to its quality. For the signaling explanation to be valid, it
is not strictly necessary that governments have private information on quality; all that is needed
is for private donors to believe that governments do and to change their voluntary level of giving
in response.
What are the policy implications of these findings? Governments fund public goods,
including but not limited to those provided by charities, and hopefully governments would do so
to increase social welfare by overcoming the free rider problem inherent in public goods. The
large prior literature on crowding out suggests that governments ought to acknowledge the effect
that their giving has on private giving and set their level of grants appropriately. The signaling
model and empirical results presented here buttress that suggestion and add that the government's
grants can influence individuals' donations not only through their effect on the level of the public
good provision but also through their effect on individuals' information about the quality of the
public good. Governments should "worry" about the negative effect that their grants can have
due to crowding out; they should also "worry" about how the signal value of their grants can
have positive effects on giving. The paper's results are also relevant to private donors, especially

31
32

Giving USA (2010). The remaining private donations are from bequests (8 percent) and corporations (5 percent).
Nonprofits apply for federal grants through grants.gov, the same service that researchers apply for grants.
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large donors like foundations who may influence government grants or other private donations
through the crowding in or crowding out effects of their contributions.
A number of additional questions clarifying these effects and the appropriate policy
responses for governments and private donors may be answered in further research. I have
identified that government grants crowd in private donations for the charities in this data set, and
I have supplied some evidence that this crowding in arises from the signaling value of the
government grants. Further research could verify that signaling is the true cause of crowding in
or examine other potential reasons for crowding in, for example economies of scale in a charity's
provision of public goods. This may be answered using similar data on actual contributions or in
a controlled laboratory setting. Further research could also address the question of the disparity
in results between the many papers that find crowding out of private donations and the many,
including this one, that find crowding in. An extension using data from other charities besides
social service charities would be useful. Finally, development of a thorough theoretical model to
capture the many effects that could cause crowding in or crowding out in either direction, that
may include charity fundraising, multiple public goods or charities,33 and dynamics, would be a
helpful addition to the literature.
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Models that consider multiple public goods include Bergstrom et. al. (1986), Mutuswami and Winter (2004), and
Ghosh et. al. (2007). Empirically, Parker and Thurman (2011) find both crowding out and crowding in for two
different government programs preserving open space, and Albers et. al. (2008) examine public provision of land
reserves and find crowding in in California and crowding out in Illinois and Massachusetts.
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Table 1

Summary Statistics – Charity Revenues and Fundraising
Number of
Observations

Number of
Organizations

Mean
($1,000s)

Standard
deviation
($1,000s)

Median
($1,000s)

75th
percentile
($1,000s)

Full Sample

339,716

76,725

Private Donations
Government Grants
Program Service
Revenue
Other Revenue
Fundraising
Expenditures
Cleaned Sample

174,828

334
521
972

4790
3476
9413

44
0
61

165
156
396

111
25

1345
510

8
0

43
2

29,138

Private Donations
267
799
41
206
Government Grants
431
1296
0
241
Program Service
755
1833
117
562
Revenue
Other Revenue
89
384
12
56
Fundraising
21
103
0
4
Expenditures
Notes: Data are averaged over 1998-2003 in constant 2002 dollars. Private donations include direct and indirect
public support. Other revenue includes interest, rents and sales.

Table 2

Government Grants
Fundraising Expenditures
Program Service Revenue
Other Revenues
Age
Population
Income (2003$ per capita)
Unemployment Rate
Percent Population > 65
Number Dem Senators
Percent Congress members Dem
Indicator for Democratic governor
Observations
Number of Organizations

The Determinants of Private Donationsa
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.145
0.0740***
0.253**
(0.110)
(0.0184)
(0.100)
8.550
15.64***
-0.922
(6.340)
(0.731)
(6.673)
-0.00307
-0.0210***
0.0924*
(0.0389)
(0.00263)
(0.0507)
-0.0161
-0.265***
-0.0218
(0.0170)
(0.0250)
(0.0249)
14,558
1,170***
28,288
(17,584)
(372.0)
(34,838)
0.00284
-0.0215***
0.00875
(0.00445)
(0.00256)
(0.00794)
0.294
-2.803***
-0.651
(0.960)
(0.586)
(1.621)
-7,175
-9,856***
2,579
(5,603)
(2,399)
(8,286)
1.006e+06
-393,949* -2.586e+06
(2.202e+06) (214,563) (3.376e+06)
-3,423
-16,781***
-6,853
(4,848)
(5,247)
(6,107)
15,220
-36,763*
8,476
(24,544)
(21,289)
(33,817)
-7,119
458.1
-17,206***
(5,685)
(8,443)
(6,511)
161,838
161,838
79,440
26,973
26,973
13,245

F-statistic on instruments for government grants
in first-stage regressionb
(p-value)

(4)
0.168
(0.163)
8.986
(5.923)
-0.0116
(0.0187)
-0.0370
(0.0285)
-4,833
(5,941)
-0.00126
(0.00165)
0.417
(0.300)
-2,554
(2,260)
753,512
(791,934)
3,333
(2,217)
6,195
(10,868)
-2,092
(2,268)
146,094
25,137

(5)
0.198
(0.268)
10.52
(10.24)
0.00463
(0.0817)
-0.00969
(0.0114)
-487.3
(1,021)
-0.000304
(0.00152)
1.613
(2.631)
1,614
(3,814)
662,376
(1.627e+06)
-4,209
(5,407)
21,206
(26,541)
-9,457
(6,174)
236,373
46,797

22.68

4.37

16.47

19.82

52.45

(0.000)

(0.013)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)
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F-statistic on instruments for fundraising
expenditures in first-stage regressionc
(p-value)
Hansen J-statistic
(p-value)
Cragg-Donald F-statistic
Tobit?
Exclude Select Charities?
Balanced Panel?
a

7.71

897.73

5.60

2.19

21.57

(0.000)
0.490
(0.783)
1.750
No
No
Yes

(0.000)
–
–
–
Yes
No
Yes

(0.000)
1.041
(0.594)
1.524
No
Yes
Yes

(0.0669)
0.380
(0.827)
0.804
No
Yes
Yes

(0.000)
2.633
(0.268)
0.602
No
No
No

The dependent variable in each column is private donations. Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years
(except column 6), whose reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount in a
revenue category. Charity-fixed-effects and year indicator variables are included in each regression. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors are in parentheses. Column 1 results are from the cleaned sample. The regression results in column 2 are from an IV Tobit regression without
organization fixed effects. Column 3 excludes charities that include "National" or "American" in their names, are classified as support organizations, or never
have nonzero values for government grants or private donations. Column 4 excludes observations where the level of government grants or the level of private
donations is in the top 5 percent among all observations. Column 5 includes the full, unbalanced panel, including organizations that are not in the panel the full
six years.
b
Instruments for government grants are the state-year total payments paid to individuals through SSI and the state-year payments paid to individuals through SSI
for the aged.
c
Instruments for fundraising expenditures are the charity's management expenditures and its total liabilities.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3

Private Donations
Fundraising Expenditures
Program Service Revenue
Other Revenues
Age
Population
Income (2003$ per capita)
Unemployment Rate
Percent Population > 65
Number Dem Senators
Percent Congress members
Dem
Indicator for Dem governor
Observations
Number of Organizations
F-statistic on instruments for
private donations in firststage regressionb

The Determinants of Government Grantsa
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.533
-0.461***
-1.350
0.632**
(0.973)
(0.131)
(1.875)
(0.265)
1.293
2.750***
3.070
-0.159
(1.490)
(0.478)
(3.160)
(0.162)
-0.269***
-0.151***
-0.476***
-0.0431***
(0.0323)
(0.00391)
(0.0405)
(0.00556)
-0.0290
0.0369
-0.0434
-0.00380
(0.0260)
(0.0232)
(0.0574)
(0.00419)
-22,759
20,046***
-71,224
-7,297
(26,198)
(750.7)
(62,247)
(6,908)
0.00751
-0.0123***
0.0226
0.000411
(0.00618)
(0.00364)
(0.0199)
(0.00181)
-1.284
-7.678***
-3.616
-0.432*
(0.862)
(0.800)
(3.112)
(0.234)
-2,370
73,501***
-5,777
-1,138
(2,138)
(3,762)
(4,409)
(765.2)
-1.813e+06
337,092
-7.367e+06
-253,502
(1.727e+06)
(346,811)
(5.279e+06)
(272,737)
3,731
122,927***
-6,131
-2,377
(4,463)
(8,571)
(16,365)
(1,540)
45,541
-314,452***
184,283*
10,200

(5)
(6)
-0.272
1.965***
(0.784)
(0.633)
0.891
32.49***
(1.283)
(11.15)
-0.250***
-0.265***
(0.0254)
(0.0442)
-0.00394
0.0631
(0.0119)
(0.0591)
229.1
-44,280
(1,179)
(46,852)
0.00192**
-0.0145
(0.000776)
(0.0131)
-3.849*
1.866
(2.036)
(3.116)
-8,778***
-29,099***
(2,489)
(11,060)
-711,615 1.424e+07***
(775,185)
(4.021e+06)
4,300
-6,577
(3,351)
(15,948)
29,601
4,879

(29,404)
11,113*
(6,382)
161,838
26,973

(33,345)
15,030
(13,492)
161,838
26,973

(96,024)
15,017
(21,509)
79,440
13,245

(8,066)
3,754**
(1,888)
146,094
25,137

(22,191)
13,820**
(5,389)
236,373
46,797

(93,421)
15,786
(21,122)
161,838
26,973

7.00

644.58

3.43

16.71

8.84

13.24
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(p-value)
F-statistic on instruments for
fundraising expenditures in
first-stage regressionc
(p-value)
Cragg-Donald F-statistic
Tobit?
Exclude Select Charities?
Balanced Panel?
Fundraising Endogenous?
a

(0.008)

78.63
No
No
Yes
No

(0.000)

–
Yes
No
Yes
No

(0.064)

48.44
No
Yes
Yes
No

(0.000)

50.99
No
Yes
Yes
No

(0.003)

91.16
No
No
No
No

(0.000)
8.64

(0.000)
27.58
No
No
Yes
Yes

The dependent variable in each column is government grants. Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six
years (except column 6), whose reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount
in a revenue category. Charity-fixed-effects and year indicator variables are included in each regression. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors are in parentheses. Column 1 results are from the cleaned sample. The regression results in column 2 are from an IV Tobit regression without
organization fixed effects. Column 3 excludes charities that include "National" or "American" in their names, are classified as support organizations, or never
have nonzero values for government grants or private donations. Column 4 excludes observations where the level of government grants or the level of private
donations is in the top 5 percent among all observations. Column 5 includes the full, unbalanced panel, including organizations that are not in the panel the full
six years. Column 6 allows fundraising to enter the regression as an endogenous right-hand-side variable.
b
The instrument for private donations is the charity's reported level of dues revenue.
c
Instruments for fundraising expenditures are the charity's management expenditures and its total liabilities.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4

The Effect of Age on Crowding Ina
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Government Grants
0.959*** 0.293*** 0.825**
2.617** 0.877***
(0.366)
(0.0529)
(0.345)
(1.135)
(0.320)
Charity Age
8,461
4,617***
10,137
34,662**
(9,471)
(775.5)
(13,055)
(13,840)
Age*Grants
-0.0254*** -0.0089*** -0.0207*** -0.154**
(0.00877) (0.00139) (0.00735) (0.0623)
Age Squared
-125.2
(209.0)
Age Squared*Grants
0.00185**
(0.000755)
Age Quartile 2
159,065***
(31,838)
Age Quartile 3
225,617***
(51,810)
Age Quartile 4
251,869***
(56,645)
Age Quartile 2*Grants
-0.657***
(0.198)
Age Quartile 3*Grants
-0.819***
(0.235)
Age Quartile 4*Grants
-0.857***
(0.257)
Ln(Age)
Ln(Age)*Grants

Observations
Number of
Organizations
Marginal Effect of
Age (at median grant
level)b
Marginal Effect of
Grants (at 10th
percentile age)c
Marginal Effect of
Grants (at 90th
percentile age)d

(6)
-2.754
(2.369)

20,798
(111,300)
0.739
(0.721)

159,912
26,652

161,838
26,652

78,621
13,108

159,912
26,652

159,912
26,652

159,383
26,652

8461

4617***

6596

30657

66552***

1300

(9493)
0.832**

(775)
0.249***

(11809)
0.722**

(18758)
1.895**

(22685)
0.220*

(16896)
–1.56

(0.319)
–0.006

(0.046)
–0.045***

(0.301)
0.016

(0.821)
–0.548***

(0.126)
0.021

(5.49)
–0.066
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Tobit?
Exclude Select
Charities?b
a

(0.069)
No
No

(0.0038)
Yes
No

(0.086)
No
Yes

(0.151)
No
No

(0.069)
No
No

(0.693)
No
No

The dependent variable in each column is private donations. Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those
organizations that are in the panel for all six years, whose reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total
revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount in a revenue category. Only those
charities with a consistent value for age are included. Instruments and control variables from Table 2 all appear in
these regressions, though not reported. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in
parentheses. Column 1 results are from the cleaned sample. The regression results in column 2 are from an IV
Tobit regression without organization fixed effects. Column 3 excludes charities that include "National" or
"American" in their names, are classified as support organizations, or never have nonzero values for government
grants or private donations. Columns 4–6 include the same set of charities as column 1, but column 4 includes a
quadratic term in age, column 5 includes four categorical indicator variables for age quartile, and column 6 increases
the natural log of age rather than the level.
b
In column 5, this value is the effect of moving from the second to the third age quartile at the median grant level.
c
In column 5, this value is the marginal effect of grants for charities in the second age quartile.
d
In column 5, this value is the marginal effect of grants for charities in the fourth age quartile.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5

Lagged Grantsa
(1)
Government Grants
Lagged Government Grants

-0.0932
(0.185)

(2)
0.432**
(0.177)
-0.630**
(0.280)

Two-Year Lagged Government Grants

(3)
0.276
(0.182)
-0.0934
(0.297)
-0.347
(0.259)

Cumulative Government Grants
Observations
Number of Organizations
a

134,865
26,973

134,865
26,973

107,892
26,973

(4)
0.237***
(0.0453)

-0.00374*
(0.00227)
134,865
26,973

The dependent variable in each column is private donations. Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six
years, whose reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total revenues, likewise for expenses, and who never report a negative amount in a revenue
category. Instruments and control variables from Table 2 all appear in these regressions, though not reported. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors are in parentheses. Cumulative government grants in time t is the sum of grants to that charity in all periods 1 through t – 1.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

